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Introduction
This paper provides a compazative framework for the discussion of transitions in labour
relations in a number of selected countries in the former eastern europe; Bulgazia, the Czech
and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland and the Siberian region of Russia. Under previous
political regimes, the common features of state ownership of enterprises, party political control
and central planning shaped the labour relations models of these countries. With the transition
to mazket economies and political pluralism, there aze a number of contingent changes in labour
relations which are occurring at the national and enterprise levels. On the basis of comparisons
between the selected countries we discuss some of these changes. We begin with an overview
of the theoretical and comparative issues in the contemporazy study of labour relations in eastern
europe. The discussion then proceeds to a consideration of the key constituent themes of labour
relations changes: first, the development of enterprise strategv associated with privatisation and
with the restructuring of enterprises including the development of new mechanisms of
organisational and management control. Second, the changing role of trade unionism, both at
national and enterprise levels. This leads us to consider the broader economic and political
context of trade unionism and the extent to which various forms of tripartism are emerging in
each of the countries. The discussion then focuses upon developments at the level of the
enterprise and reviews trends in collective bargaining and worker participation. The discussion
concludes by identifying some common trends in each of the five countries. It also emphasises
sources of diversity and argues that in the transition to various forms of mazket economy labour
relations models in each of the countries will continue to be chazacterised by contrasting features
linked to the prevailing political conditions and the fortunes of the economy.
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Transition or Transformation?
The contemporary literature on eastern europe is concerned with the nature of the "transition"
which these societies are facing. The enormity of the task, that of attempting to create
democratic political institutions whilst dramatically transforming the property basis of the
economy, is without precedent in recent world history. It is hardly surprising that, in this test
bed situation for theorists of political democracy and societal transformation, changes in labour
relations have been somewhat neglected. Most contemporary discussions of eastern europe are
focused around either political changes or macro-economic developments; labour relations have
received considerably less attention both from commentators on, and actors engaged in, the
change process. The development of new patterns of labour relations are highly dependent upon
the prevailing economic conditions which in turn are conditioned by political processes. This
derived or contingent nature of labour relations changes has led some to argue that it is too
early to try and study labour relations at the enterprise level as new patterns are yet to be
institutionalised. However, we seek to argue that developments in labour relations are
constituent elements in the jigsaw of transformation processes for the following reasons. In the
past the enterprise was the institutional articulation of political control, attempts to transform
the polity face an underdeveloped civil society in which, traditionally, conflicts of interest were
focused around the workplace, rather than the community, political parties or interest groups.
Equally attempts to transform the property structure and the relations of production are
constrained by the habits of management and workers at enterprise level developed over the
long period of the command economy. The strength and persistence of these enterprise based
patterns and habits varies from country to country according to recent past policies of economic
reform and the specific processes of regime collapse in each case. Nevertheless, in all cases
labour relations at enterprise level remain of critical significance in the success or failure of
different change strategies. The need to restructure the labour process and to introduce capitalist
patterns of labour control are the necessary corollary of the attempt to transform the economy
into a largely privately owned market system. The difficulty of doing this in practice is what
makes labour relations a key issues for regime change.' (Filtzer, 1991; Burawoy and Krotov,
1992).
The concept of transition has been challenged as value-laden and deterministic, implying that
all of these societies are "on the road" to capitalism. Stark has argued that the concept of
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transformation is preferable because it highlights the differences between the eastern european
countries and does not prejudge the kinds of systems which will be established.2 In the field
of labour relations we would argue that the notion of transition is valid in the sense of transition
from a particular model of "Soviet" labour relations, however, the question of transition to is
an open one. Transformation is used to stress the dynamic processes unfolding in each country,
however, the term needs to be operationalised as a concept to make it theoretically useful. We
take transformation to refer to issues of continuity and discontinuity within each of the countries
and of similazity and uniqueness between countries.
The Context of Change
1fie general elements of the previous model of labour relations aze well known. They
conformed to the economic model of central planning, party political control and state
ownership. In this approach trade unions operated within the parameters of planning and party
control, grade rates were fixed nationally by "tariff scales"; although there were collective
agreements there was no recognition of collective bazgaining or of strikes. Trade union structure
conformed to that of the branch (industry) ministries and operated on the principles of
"democratic centralism". The institutions for employee participation in management and in some
countries `self management' were, however, highly developed whether through the structures
of enterprise councils at the level of the enterprise or at lower organisational levels such as the
brigade as in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. There were significant variations in the nature of
enterprise level employee participation between countries and these differences may be reflected
in contemporary developments. Stazk makes a parallel point with regard to the processes of
privatisation; he argues that the key factors which limit or condition the direction of
transformation are the patterns of political mobilisation prior to regime collapse and the paths
of extrication from the stranglehold of the party.'
Consideration of the emerging models of labour relations in Eastern Europe has to recognise
that these have been contingent upon three conditions. First that political, academic and populaz
attention on the process of transition has centred on issues of democracy and marketisation; that
is on the parallel processes of change in the political institutions and of changes in the
management of the economy, they have only focused indirectly on labour relations systems.
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Second, that the economic and social context has been one of inflation, rising unemployment
and reductions in the standard of living for many sections of national populations. For the post -
socialist governments the central political issue has been, therefore, a process of seeking to
create structures and mechanisms for the creation of market economies while at the same time
maintaining a minimum level of social and political integration. Specifically this has meant
Governments choosing the pace and sequence of macro economic measures - the shock
treatment of rapid change (the liberal market) or, a more gradual process (the social market).
In such economic conditions trade unions often function as agencies of social integration through
their negotiations with governments.
At the same time attempts to establish political pluralism have meant the replacement of the old
Party organisations by a plethora of political parties which are little more than `elite vehicles','
in that popular membership is low by comparison with that of the communist parties which they
have replaced. Consequently trade unions as organisations with mass memberships are in a
position to perform a representational function for their rank-and-file members that is only
partially undertaken by political parties. Third, privatisation has taken various forms including
intermediate forms of state ownership and has progressed at different rates in different
countries. However, in each case the state remains, directly or indirectly, the main employer
as well as the major agency for mechanisms of macro-economic policy. The privatisation
process itself requires state~riven social engineering on an unprecedented scale, which an
ideology of marketisation tends to obscure. As Offe has commented this is involves a process
of "political capitalism" or "capitalism by design".S Consequently, emerging models of labour
relations are highly contingent upon patterns of political mobilisation and upon the degree of
political consensus. The institutionalisation of new models of labour relations in these unstable
conditions is, therefore, uncertain and in some countries complicated by government's attempts
to establish a new normative framework in advance of economic reform and privatisation. To
investigate the transformation of labour relations we need to consider both changes at the
national level, that is the developing legislation and national framework and its impact on the
enterprise level and, the relative autonomy of enterprises ín responding to and initiating
changes. We begin by looking at the development of enterprise strategy as one foundation for
changes in labour relations.
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Enterprise Strategies in the Context of Marketisation.
In order to review the developing role of management within the post-communist enterprise it
is necessary to set the issues in the context of the operation of the earlier socialist enterprise and
its internal and external relations. Under the system of central planning the relations of
enterprises with both customers and suppliers were mainly determined by ministry officials.
These were `allocated' from above through the mechanism of `state orders'. There was
substantial central control over prices of products and raw materials and over wages. The `taziff
wage system prescribed the rates for the different grades while the Wage Funds were closely
controlled. `In a socialist economy the analysis of wages has to start from central wage policy
because the latter is actually enforced' (Kornai). There was significant central influence over
the design of the internal structures of the enterprise; as for example in the brigade system of
work which was widespread in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Significantly,
it was wage reform in Hungary associated with the VGMKs and the Law on Cooperatives in
the Soviet Union which provided unusual opportunities to alter internal organisational structures
and labour relations. In this environment the most important activity of enterprise Directors was
bargaining over plan targets and for resources with higher levels within the industry.b In
general the importance of the enterprise was defined according to the number of employees and
the reduction of the labour force to increase efficiency was neither politically acceptable nor
encouraged by the mechanisms of central planning.'
The constraints on enterprise autonomy in the planned economy meant that the scope for
enterprise strategy was very limited, that is, in the choice of mazkets, the design of enterprise
structures and in labour relations. The market economy in theory enlarges the scope for
enterprise strategy. The concept of `mazketisation'in the context of Eastern Europe and Russia
is a complex one. In part, it involves processes of deregulation such as price liberalisation as
a mechanism of macro-economic stabilisation. This, however, has been in part a mechanism for
relating prices more closely to costs than to promoting competition between suppliers. Similarly,
the freeing of central control over wages has been offset, for example by the Polish popiwek
or tax on wage increases in the state owned sector though not in the sector under private
ownership. In the centralised economy the most important source of revenue was the turnover
tax on enterprises and enterprise taxation can still be important as, for example, in Bulgaria.
Subject to such qualifications the process of marketisation is sometimes seen as involving five
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main stages:
1. The exposure of state owned companies to market forces by the reduction (though not
necessarily the abolition) of state subsidies and state orders and with it, a reduction in
the allocative function of ministries.
2. Deregulation of prices and wages giving enterprises more autonomy in these areas.
3. Competition in product markets and suppliers.
4. Organisational restructuring typically involving degrees of decentralisation and
divisionalisation.
5. Changes in ownership.
It is vital to point out that these processes were underway in some countries in advance of
communist regime collapse and that this sequence has been and is being followed in different
orders and at varying speeds across the five countries. It is important to stress the element of
continuity in some of these processes, to counteract the largely ideological assumption that for
the development of eastern european enterprises there are absolutely distinct "before" and
"after" phases of regime collapse.
In the above discussion of marketisation, ownership change has not been accorded the primary
place that it has received in both eastern and some western approaches to economic reform. In
east european theory state ownership has traditionally been regarded as a fundamental basis of
both the economy and of labour relations. From this it has been deduced that the prerequisite
for changing the behaviour of enterprises and the managers and employees who work in them
has been ownership change. The assumption has been that changing the economy has to be
based on a change in property relations. Our approach hypothesises that the relationship between
ownership change, enterprise behaviour and labour relations is in reality much more complex,
because ownership change is only one and not always the most important aspect of the process
of marketisation. Ownership change itself cannot be treated as an undifferentiated category.
In considering the relationship between privatisation and labour relations it is first necessary to
draw a sharp distinction between the privatisation of large industrial enterprises and that of
small enterprises whether engaged in production, retail or other services. As for example Kosek
and Cziria show in these organisations there has been a sharp fall in union membership and
relationships between management and workforce are individualised.g In terms of ownership
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change in the larger state organisations there aze three direct questions which relate to labour
relations: first, whether employees (or their representatives) aze formally given a role in the
process of ownership change; second, whether employees (or their representatives aze accorded
any proprietorial status following the change of ownership; and third, whether in such cases it
has any significance in practice.
In relation to the first question the national models fall into two groups. In Russia and Poland
endorsement from employees or their representatives is required for changes of ownership; in
Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Bulgaria it is not. The consent of the Russian
labour collective is required while in Poland the agent is the Employee Council. At present the
predominant form of ownership change is to that of the joint stock company based on
shareownership. In this form, in practice, there are a vaziety of options in the ownership of
shares, which inciude both individual and institutional mechanisms in varying combinations. The
individual shazeholders may be employees, managers and citizens; the institutional include state
agencies, other enterprises, banks and financial institutions. From the standpoint of labour
relations the basic division is between the models which include employee shazeawnership as
a matter of right and those which do not. Again Russia and Poland aze in this group but the
Polish model includes provision (unique in eastern europe) for union representation on
supervisory boards, (however, accompanied by the termination of the employee council with
the act of ownership change). At present in Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics there
is no provision for employee shareholding as such although, in Czech and Slovak Republics
employees may hold some shares acquired as citizens. In relation to the general issue of
enterprise autonomy a big question is the nature of institutional shareownership and control.
With the exception of the Czech republic there are as yet no concentrations of external financial
institutions of the western type and the predominant form remains that of the state agency, as
in Hungary, or the banks.
Thus, the processes of mazketisation aze complex and a rapid and smooth transition to what is
normaliy meant by privatisation in the west is far from being achieved. The implications of
mazketisation for management within the enterprise aze in the first instance relatively cleaz;
senior management has to refocus its activities towazds the market and the development of new
mazket strategies. This requires both an external focus but also the need to develop internal
strategies for organisation and labour control. The role of middle management needs to change
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considerably. In the past middle management played a largely operational role dependent upon
core workers to achieve production targets, this resulted in a tendency to hoard labour, tolerate
low productivity, high absenteeism and poor quality, in which, as Thompson and Smith
comment, a:
...dual control system of managers and party mobilise to meet production targets
through a vaziety of inechanisms including an employment relationship based on a
'social contract' with the workforce; a technical division of labour frequently depended
on high degrees of flexibility and work group autonomy; piece work and normative
rewazd systems. 9
The middle management group is in a particulazly ambivalent position viz-a-viz ownership
changes and the uncertainty they bring. However, this group is also crucial for the enterprise's
success in terms of their ability to mobilise the workforce and translate corporate strategies into
effective operational management. The key processes of organisational restructuring suggest a
transformation of middle management roles in the process of divisionalisation. It implies the
need both for new skills and new accountabilities.
Exposure to mazketisation, which in the first instance typically means the reduction of state
orders, is frequently connected with internal restructuring of the enterprise, usually initiated by
enterprise management but sometimes in collaboration with state agencies. Such restructuring,
whether directly or indirectly linked to changes in ownership, is usually geared to linking
different units of the enterprise with specific products. This process - often of divisionalisation
and decentralisation -gives the opportunity to engage, usually for the first time, in the process
of business strategy. That is, of deciding markets and products, and of formulating
organisational strategy by developing appropriate organisational structures and mechanisms of
change. Senior managers aze therefore engaged in the sequence of strategy and structural change
in the sense of divisionalisation to secure more effective relations with product mazkets
(Chandler). Internal restructuring and divisionalisation has implications for labour relations
especially through the segmentation of internal labour mazkets.
Relationships between ownership change, as a stage in marketisation, and organisational
restructuring and changes in labour relations is often complex for the following reasons.
Processes of ownership change vary significantly both between countries and within countries
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and therefore we might expect considerable diversity in outcomes. In addition, in Eastern
Europe, though much less so in Russia, new frameworks, institutions and mechanisms have
been established at national level for the regulation of industrial relations. These include new
and reconstructed trade union confederations, the legal recognition of strikes and collective
bargaining and the development of national and occasionally local tripartite institutions. General
Agreements negotiated at national level in Hungary, Bulgazia and the Czech and Slovak
Republics have been significant sources of standards influencing the conduct of labour relations
and therefore of managerial strategy at enterprise level.
In practice the pace of privatisation has varied considerably from country to country and has
generally been slower than was anticipated, the State remains a very significant employer. In
addition, the State is likely to continue to be a major player in economic reform in the
foreseeable future. However, as our evidence indicates, even in the absence of ownership
change most enterprises have begun to restructure either in the face of changing mazkets for
their products andlor in preparation for privatisation.
Offe has identified a"dilemma of simultaneity" in the political sphere where new nations, new
constitutions and new party politics have to be created simultaneously, in the labour relations
sphere we can identify the similaz problem of trying to reconstruct labour codes and normative
frameworks suitable for a mazket economy and pluralist democracy whilst simultaneously trying
to establish such an economy and democracy. This may result in, what elsewhere has been
chazacterised as, pre-emptive normative regulation.'o We might therefore expect a continuing
tension between the national and enterprise levels of labour relations. To some extent trade
unions are a vehicle for this potential dissonance and it is to them we turn next.
The Role of Trade Unionism
Generally, with the exception of Russia, the first changes in existing models of labour relations
occurred with the emergence of specific alternatives to the already established trade union
organisations. This was the case with Solidarity in Poland in 1982 and the emergence of new
trade unions in Hungazy affiliated to the Democratic League in the autumn of 1988, facilitated
by the law on associations and political pluralism. This was equally so in Bulgaria with the
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emergence of Podkrepa in November 1989. Laws on strikes and disputes were also an early
feature of changes in the model of labour relations, as in Poland in 1982, Hungary in March
1989, Bulgazia in March 1990 and Czechoslovakia in early 1991.
The principal features of trade unionism in relation to the transitional models of labour relations
may be described as follows. First, their significance as agents in strategy formulation at both
the national and enterprise levels. This relates to shifts in the relationships and the balance of
forces between political and industrial interests. Second, their key role in interest representation,
especially at the national political level, in a period when many new political parties aze
emerging and multiplying. Trade unions are organisations with mass memberships and claim
to represent the interests not only of employees but also of other lazge sections of the population
such as pensioners and the increasing numbers of the unemployed. Przeworski argues that the
role of trade unions in the process of economic reform is crucial because on the one hand they
incorporate workers who aze a potential source of wage pressure and hence of inflation and on
the other, through their centralised organisational features they can persuade their members to
wait for the reforms to bear fruit." For these reasons he argues that it is functionally necessary
for labour unions to be centralised and all encompassing. Third, there aze changes in the
internal organisation and functions of trade unions brought about by their formal separation
from both party and state institutions.
Solidazity in Poland, as the prototype of the independent alternative to the established unionism
was, in a sense, a social movement in that its goals were as much political as they were
industrial. Since 1989 Solidarity has had to confront the dilemma of choosing between the
specialised role of defending employee's interests in questions of wages, working conditions and
employment and the more general role of `umbrella' for various post-Solidarity governments;
that is, of taking joint responsibility for ruling the country.12
In a similar fashion to Solidarity, the trade union alternatives established in Hungary and
Bulgazia were also social movements in that they functione~í at the national and industrial levels
because of their opposition to ihe Party and its affiliated unions. However, it is important to
recognise that in both Bulgazia and Hungary initial support for these newly created unions was
mainly concentrated in the non- manufacturing sectors of the economy. Hence they obtained
their support among teachers, scientific workers and employees in azeas of the health service.
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Underlying such patterns of support were the pre-revolutionary state socialist wage policies
which gave priority to heavy manual work in productive industry rather than to the professional,
non-productive activities undertaken by employees in the service sectors."
In Russia no significant independent trade union movement has emerged, as in the cases referred
to above some professional groups, such as airline pilots have recognised their bargaining
position and have developed trade union like organisations." In general, however, the Russian
trade unions have not emerged as an important political force in the process of economic change
either nationally or at enterprise level; they are still tainted as institutions associated with the
past regime. Russian workers do not appear to conceive of independent trade unionism as a
vehicle for mobilisation. As Clarke comments:
The trade union within the enterprise was and is effectively a patronage network,
integrated into and working alongside the management structure.15
However, for this reason membership levels do not appear to have declined dramatically.
The advent of Solidarity in Poland and of political pluralism in Bulgaria and Hungary, and the
challenges from the alternative unions have brought about changes in the organisation, design
and operation of the existing established union centres. This has led to three basic changes: their
independence from the party; the end of democratic centralism as an organising principle; and
the creation of confederal structures. This has taken place in Bulgaria, Hungary and in
Czechoslovakia, (where there was no important challenge from newly formed alternative
unions). In both Bulgaria and Hungary the reformed centres have retained the largest
membership.1ó
The duality between the political and the industrial functions of trade unionism relates to their
operation at different levels of the economy, the national political level where basic decisions
about macro-economic policy are made, and at the enterprise level where their members are
employed. At the national level the political function has been mainly expressed through
tripartite forums. However, in specific political conditions such as in Bulgaria in 1991 -2, the
national trade union confederations have operated as agencies of strategy formulation on major
issues of economic policy including the pace and content of ineasures for economic reform.
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This national political role of trade unions has sometimes predominated over industry level
concerns and this may help to explain the reduction of inembership interest at the enterprise
level. Linked to this there has often been an intermediating or controlling role such as that of
Solidarity, for example in the Silesian mining dispute of 1992-3. Similarly in Bulgaria, the
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgazia (CTTLJB) has frequently been an agent
of intermediation in important disputes that have azisen in particular industries or enterprises.
Such a role inevitably creates contradictions and tensions in relation to rank-and-file members,
since trade unions appear to function ~h as agents of government and as representatives of
worker interests. This poses the question for the trade unions of whether keeping governments
in office is more important than representing rank-and-file demands and whether there could be
a`backlash' from members if redundancies increase and living standards fall. The experience
from the CITUB in Bulgaria suggests that although workers in specific sectors or enterprises
may be dissatisfied with their conditions, the leading role of the trade union confederation as
the chief agency for representing member interests has, so faz, maintained a lazge measure of
support. This is mainly because key decisions on minimum wages and the setting of budgets for
social security - unemployment benefits and prices for key items such as food - are taken
through negotiations and agreements at the national level.
Trade union density in socialist countries was extremely high; typically over 90 per cent. This
was mainly because the availability of enterprise social funds for housing, holidays,
kindergartens, transport and other social welfare benefits were distributed through the trade
unions. Increases in unemployment, privatisation programmes, especially of small service
organisations, and the disappearance, except so faz in the Czech and Slovak Republics, of Social
Funds is likely to lead to a reduction in union membership. In Poland, membership of both
Solidarity and OPZZ appeazs to be in significant decline. However, figures for the Czech and
Slovak Republics "suggest that this may not be inevitable, in addition, despite the declines in
Bulgazia and Hungary membership of the confederations remains substantial.
It is clear from this discussion that there is a major difference between Russia and the East
European countries with regard to the evolution of the trade union movement. This is also
reflected in the development of tripartite forums to which we turn next.
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Tripartism
National tripartite forums have been established in all of the countries. A number of questions
arise in relation to the development of these processes. First, the timing and the context in
which the relevant institutions were established. Second, the scope of issues covered by tripartite
processes. Third, their legal standing and their degree of institutionalisation.
The prototype of a national tripartite council was created in Hungary in October 1988 while the
Socialist Workers Party was still in Government. A key agent in this process was the Research
Institute of Labour attached to the Ministry of Labour which contributed to the design of
appropriate structures. The contexts for the establishment of tripartism were the processes of
economic reform emerging at this time associated with increasing enterprise autonomy and some
decentralisation of control over wages, which required the replacement of bureaucratic methods
of wage determination by processes more appropriate to a market economy.18
In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the National Commission created in February 1990 was the
outcome of the political and economic crisis and industrial unrest that followed the political
changes of November 1989. In January 1990 the reformed official trade unions (CITUB)
demanded that the government should negotiate a General Agreement with them as a mechanism
for securing political, economic and social consensus. Following the change of government in
January 1990 a National Commission for the Reconciliation of Interests was established in order
to negotiate this agreement. Thus, the CITUB was a leading agency in the creation of this
structure and it also played a role in the formation of an organisation of state employers as the
third party of tripartism.
The establishment of the Council for Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1990 at the federal level
was requested by the trade union confederation with the ready acquiescence of the government.
The Council negotiated the first general agreement for the year 1991. In Poland, however, the
creation of tripartite institutions was avoided until September 1992 although discussions of the
relevance of a`corporatist ' model had been common for several years. Hitherto, there had been
informal and separate bipartite discussions between successive governments and the two
confederations, Solidarity and OPZZ . Kuron, as Minister of Labour, was a leading agent in
the process of trying to negotiate the State Enterprise Pact. This development took place against
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increasing strike pressure, which was only halted pending the outcome of the Pact, and evidence
of widespread popular alienation from the political process.19
In Russia a Federal and some branch Tripartite Commissions were established at the end of
1991 and the beginning of 1992. The General Tripartite agreement for 1993 is of a very general
and all encompassing nature, being more of a wish list than a binding undertaking.~
Whether the range of issues covered by tripartite discussions is broad or narrow largely reflects
the balance of power between governments and trade unions and the broader social context at
specific periods of time. The most common subject, with the exception of Russia, has been
agreements on minimum and maximum wage increases, pensions, and the basis of wage
indexation in relation to prices. This has been the case in Hungary since 1989, Bulgaria from
1990, and Czechoslovakia after 1991. This will also be a function of the Polish National
Commission. The range of issues coveretl by tripartism has also broadened in these countries.
In Hungary in 1991 and 1992 the NCRI played a significant role in securing agreement on the
social security provisions for the budget and in reform of the principles of enterprise taxation.
In Slovakia, towards the end of 1992, the main focus of discussions was the allocation of social
expenditure from within the state budget, for example unemployment benefits, food and
transport subsidies and the rules for the Enterprise Social Fund, rather than upon the content
of a General Agreement for 1993.
Issues of privatisation are of course, central to economic reforms. The great innovation of the
Kuron Pact in Poland is the agreement for the involvement of trade unions in the process of
privatisation and the distribution of shares to workers. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia
privatisation has been a governmental process operating outside both tripartite forums and
negotiations with trade unions. In Bulgaria during the period of the coalition government
(December 1990- October 1991), privatisation was officially within the scope of the National
Council although it was not acted upon.
The institutional status of tripartite forums has varied. In Hungary the National Council was
given formal legal status by the Employment Act of 1991 and the Labour Code of 1992, it also
has its own secretariat. In Bulgaria, the election of the coalition government in December 1990
to introduce price liberalisation meant that the government was dependent on trade union
14
support to maintain social peace. In these conditions the tripartite council operated as a standing
body in which there was both consultation, typical of the period of the socialist government,
and joint decision-making, with agreements binding on state organisations at lower levels.
Of course, tripartism, by definition, requires organisations to represent the interests of
employers in discussions. Except in Poland, where the Confederation of Polish Employers was
established at the end of 1989, the development or creation of employers' organisations has been
closely related to the creation of tripartite institutions. Thus, in Hungazy in 1988 the already
existing Chamber of the Economy became a partner in the National Council. In Bulgaria, the
initiative for facilitating the organisation of state employers in Mazch 1990 came from the
CITUB. Clearly, changes in the structure of property ownership brought about through
privatisation are leading to a plurality of employers organisations in different economic sectors.
The ease with which genuinely private employers can be incorporated into corporatist
agreements is at this stage largely untested.
Tripartite agreements are typically providing a framework for enterprise level labour relations.
In Russia branch agreements in some industries may provide a more significant role than the
national agreement. The weakness of independent trade union development in Russia, however,
puts a question mark over the significance of tripartism.
Collective Bargaining
In all five countries collective bargaining is a new feature of the transitional model and generally
it is supported within a legal framework. The issues that arise relate to its coverage, to shifts
in content from social welfaze to wages and to the legal framework as privatisation proceeds.
Contemporary discussions of collective bargaining by East Europeans tend to focus upon the
negotiation of substantive collective agreements on terms and conditions at enterprise level. In
the past collective agreements at this level did not deal with terms and conditions of
employment. There are many other issues such as the numbers and selection of employees for
redundancy which may be the subject of collective bargaining by the trade unions or of informal
bargaining between individuals or work groups and line management. ('The latter was the more
predominant in the previous system).Z' There is legal provision for collective agreements at
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enterprise level in all five countries although the significance of this varies in accordance with
national conditions. Understanding of the actual processes of negotiation at enterprise or higher
levels is constrained by a lack of survey data.
The Czechoslovak Federal Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs conducted a survey
of collective bargaining and participation in 90 enterprises in mid 1991.~ The survey showed
that in 909ó of the enterprises collective agreements had been negotiated and that of these, 86~0
were the result of trade union initiatives. In 1992 branch agreements were still used as a source
of standazds in the enterprises studied. In Bulgaria, the development of collective bargaining has
been ciosely connected with initiatives from the National Tripartite Commission which issued
Guidelines on Collective Bazgaining in April 1990 and again in April 1991. In 1990 the
coverage of workers by collective agreements was patchy and varied significantly between
branches of industry. Survey data on collective agreements was compiled in November 1991
by the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions. The 1991 survey showed that by July 1991
only 37 96 of state enterprises had negotiated collective agreements. The main stimulus to
collective agreements came from the Decree on Wages and Collective Bazgaining of 5 July
1991. This decree, which was passed in the context of the national tripartite Agreement on
Social Peace negotiated in June 1991, required collective agreements to be negotiated at
enterprise level by September. This made enterprises the o~y level for collective agreements
and thus removed the role of branches except for the social sectors of health and education. The
decree was accompanied by abolition of the centralised control over enterprise wage funds based
on the centrally determined wage rates for different grades of employee and the plan target for
manpower. The national survey of 120 enterprises in November showed that 79 ~o of enterprises
had signed agreements and a further 149'o had completed the preparatory work.~
In Poland some branch agreements from the 1980's aze still operative although their significance
is doubtful. The development of wage bargaining in state enterprises has been tightly
constrained by the high levels of taxation that have been levied on enterprises which allow wage
increases. The creation of national machinery for wage negotiations in the state sector has been
a major issue in the negotiations over the Kuron Pact. Private employers have been exempt
from this taxation but since they are mainly non-unionised there is no collective bargaining.~`
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It appears that the cunent developments in collective bargaining in all of the countries are
primarily conditional upon the national mechanisms of economic management as applied to
enterprises, for example the tax mechanism in Poland and the 1991 Decree in Bulgaria. It is
also clear that many new small privatised companies are outside the emerging model of
collective bargaining.
Participation and Consultation
The socialist enterprise has been conceptualised as having three internal vertical structures.u
The first was the structure of operational management; the second was the structure of the party
and the trade union; and the third the structure of participation in management and lor `self
management'. The most usual institutions of the latter were a general assembly of employees
(or of their representatives) and an elected council at the top of the enterprise. In the 1980s the
general trend was to increase the scope and powers of this third structure and the empowerment
of employees who were theoretically conceptualised as `co-owners'. After the collapse of the
old regimes there were two main questions to be considered at the political level. First, whether
such institutions of the third structure needed to be preserved, destroyed or replaced. Second,
what should be the relationship between institutions of participation and those of collective
bargaining. The comparison between the five countries of what has happened since the end of
state socialism shows different patterns of development.
The Polish Enterprise Council of 1981 has formally survived until the new provisions for the
privatisation of state enterprises. An initial stage was to transform the legal status of the
enterprise into a`state treasury company 'and for this the consent of the enterprise council was
required. Once the transfer is completed however, the enterprise council is dissolved so that the
legal and institutional basis of participation disappears.
In Russia the Council of the Labour Collective have also survived and are required to agree
plans for ownership change, however in some enterprises the change to a joint stock company
has been accompanied by the dissolution of the Labour Collective. It has sometimes been
replaced by other Enterprise Councils but the power of such bodies appears to be negligible.
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In Czechoslovakia the State Enterprise Act of 1988, which included provisions for an enterprise
council elected from the general assembly, which also elected the director as a principal
structure for participation, was repealed in May 1990. Its participative provisions were officially
condemned as a`relic of socialism'. Cziria and Munkova's survey showed that the provision
of information and the process of consultation continued to occur in the majority of enterprises
but through trade union channels. The Labour Code does not however prohibit the establishment
of Works Councils and it is of interest to note that in two case study enterprises managements
set up Works Councils. In the first, the West German owners wished to set up the council as
the sole structure for representation but the trade unions demanded recognition for collective
bargaining; in the second Slovak enterprise it was the management strategy to set up a Works
Council in parallel with the machinery for collective bargaining.
In Bulgaria the powers of the enterprise council were modified by Decree 56 of 1988. The
Labour Code was revised eventually at the end of 1992 after continuing negotiations between
successive governments and the trade union confederations since 1990.1fiis provided (in articles
6 and 7) for the general assembly of the workers and employees to elect representatives to
decide questions of enterprise management but did not specify any structure or mechanisms for
this. In Hungary Chapter 4 of the Labour Code of 1992 covering Employees Participative
Rights replaced the previous Enterprise Councils with Works Councils. It sets out in detail the
provisions for Works Councils which are required in every firm or establishment with more
than 50 employees though the rights are mainly consultative. In both Bulgaria and Hungary the
issue of the relationship between the institutions of participation and those of collective
bargaining became disputed between the government and the trade union confederations. In the
former, towards the end of 1991 the newly elected government of the Union of Democratic
Forces proposed that the revised Labour Code should provide for a Works Council which would
be the bargaining agent for the collective agreement rather then the trade union. In the initial
drafts of the Hungarian Labour Code the government similarly sought to make the Works
Council the bargaining agent but in Hungary, as in Bulgaria, the trade unions were successful
in resisting the government's proposals.
Thus the previous rights of employees to participate in management have been significantly
eroded in the transitional models. In socialist theory employees were co~wners of the state
property of their enterprises. Now, however, in all countries there are varying forms of
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provision for employee share ownership so that they have possibilities for some financial
participation as shareholders in their privatised enterprises. Research in Polish enterprises
suggests that workers are willing to accept routes to privatisation which destroy workplace
mechanisms of participation because privatisation is presented as l~i economic salvation of
enterprises and therefore of employment and accordingly strategies of survival predominate at
company level. Solidarity as a national organisation is committed to the consolidation of single
channel representation in which the trade union is the sole bargaining agent at enterprise level.
Trade unions have been prepared to concede the dilution of inechanisms of employee
participation in management because they have been concemed to secure and consolidate their
position as the sole bargaining agent in collective bargaining.
From the above discussion it is clear that the Hungarian case is exceptional in that Works
Councils are legally constituted. However, the elections to Works Councils in May 1993
demonstrated that in many enterprises the trade unions were successful in securing the election
of their own candidates on these bodies.
In general, we can say that changes in Labour Codes which provide the framework for a reform
of collective bargaining have acted as "anticipatory frameworks"~, in the sense of the attempt
to create a new system from above, and the desire to devise a system appropriate for a market
economy in large part before that economy exists. In the capitalist countries of the west labour
law has more typically developed organically or pragmatically in response to emerging labour
relations configurations; pre-emptive labour legislation in eastern europe may serve to structure
and limit the possibilities of development at enterprise level.
Conclusions
In conclusion we will try to draw together the pattern of developments in the different areas we
have considered: enterprise strategy and marketisation; trade unions, tripartism, collective
bargaining and participation. A general point that must be made is that emerging institutions are
fragile, precarious and unstable. The absence, presence or threat of pressure from below has
been a major condition for institutional development and change. The different routes from
communist party domination, involving either capitulation, compromise or electoral competition,
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persist in affecting the emerging labour relations models in the countries studied; this is
notwithstanding the common pattern of ideological influences from abroad and the
encouragement of western models of social partnership and the social market model of
corporatism. Not surprisingly, governments' have viewed the development of new labour
relations institutions as secondary to economic reform and privatisation.
The role of trade unions in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communist regimes'
seems to vary from country to country. Arguably they have been a driving force of social and
political change in Poland and Bulgaria. In the Czech and Slovak Republics reform by contrast
has been more consensual, whereas in Hungary governments have taken a more positive lead
role. In Russia the historical image of the trade unions has not led workers to see independent
trade unions as potential forces for representing their interests. Despite these differences
however, trade unions in all of the countries have been oriented towards the state as l~ie agent
of reform. Trade unions are compelled to act on the national political stage since their demands
cannot be pursued at the enterprise level. Hungary is perhaps the most advanced along the road
of a more enterprise based focus for trade union and labour relation activities. In the past, trade
union control of the social funds of enterprises provided the pay-off for individual membership.
Now that social security and benefits are no longer primazily provided by enterprises, these
issues have shifted to the national political stage. Trade unions in these countries claim to
represent not only the employed, but also the unemployed and pensioners, in national
negotiations over social fund and social security issues. This may help to explain the tendency
for trade union membership levels to decline, since the pay-off for individual membership has
changed. If the focus is national agreements the individual at enterprise level can free ride on
tripartite agreements without needing to belong to a trade union. However, in Russia the
persistence of a trade union role in enterprise based patronage systems may have served to
maintain membership levels, if not active participation by members. In the other countries the
salience of national economic issues and tripartite negotiations have limited the development of
trade union functions at branch and enterprise levels. If corporatist arrangements fail and aze
discredited, the legitimacy of trade unions can be compromised. Thus, trade unions can run the
risk of becoming once again "transmission belts", but this time for governments' austerity
measures.
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In all of the countries, tripartism or corporatism has azisen as a government response to the real
or perceived threat of political and industrial instability. Trade unions are a major basis for
consensus building and legitimation in a context where political parties are weak and
fragmented. Governments have faced choices between the alternative strategies of confirming
and strengthening tripartite institutions or of seeking to avoid them. ~The evidence shows that
so faz in Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics there has been an incremental
development of tripartism. The Kuron pact initiative in Poland was motivated by industrial
unrest, but prior to that, the fact that Solidazity was already enmeshed with government may
have obviated the need for formal corporatist arrangements. In Bulgaria government tried to
extricate itself from tripartism in 1992 but was only successful for a time.
T'he crucial future issue for corporatism in these countries is whether tripartite agreements are
substantively underwritten. Can the parties to political exchange deliver their side of the
bazgains? Experience from western europe would suggest that corporatism needs delivery
mechanisms at lower levels, for example collective bazgaining structures or works councils must
be capable of relaying interest intermediation to enterprise level.~ Certainly in Russia the
institutions for such intermediation aze largely absent. This suggests that the degree to which
corporatist azrangements may be articulated from national to enterprise levels is of critical
importance. In relation to this process of articulation there aze a number of potential problems.
Firstly, the weakness of employers' association questions whether trade unions or governments
will be able to make agreements enforceable, as increasing proportions of employment is located
in both private and small-scale organisations in which union membership is likely to be low or
non-existent. Secondly, can trade unions intermediate their members interests successfully
without losing rank and file support, especially if economic restructuring programmes prevent
governments from delivering social benefits?
As discussed eazlier collective bazgaining or rather collective agreements have been provided
for in the labour legislation of all the countries. These developments represent a top down
approach which raises the question of the likelihood of collective agreements being implemented
at the level of the enterprise. There aze several factors which may influence this. First, the
evidence from Bulgazia shows that the major impetus for the development of collective
agreements came from the outcome of national tripartite negotiations in 1991 which were
drafted in a form which provided for explicit articulation from the national level down to the
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level of the enterprise.
Similazly, the development of enterprise collective agreements in Czechoslovakia in 1990 and
1991 was partly dependent on the content of the national General Agreement although this
articulation was not backed by legal requirements. Second, at this time the enterprises were still
State property so that the State at national level could instruct, if necessary, State managers at
enterprise level to implement the agreements. As the process of privatisation proceeds the issue
of collective bazgaining at lower levels will become an issue of managerial strategy by
employers who are no longer State employees.
It is clear from the experience of Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics that in small firms
in the retail, trading and other service sectors employers frequently do not recognise trade
unions and consequently there is no collective bazgaining.~ The prospects for collective
bazgaining as larger enterprises aze privatised is less clear. Whether these employers will seek
to withdraw from collective agreements will depend upon the contingent conditions such as, the
strength of union organisation in the enterprise, the influence of the union externally and
especially on the nature and coverage of national tripartite agreements. In relation to the latter
much will depend on the development or decline of industrial conflict and on the perceptions
of the prospect for social peace.
Collective bazgaining through trade unions has provided one channel of representation;
employee or works councils can provide a second channel. However, as discussed above only
Hungary has legal provisions for works councils and has thus, formalised dual channel
representation. In Poland the processes of privatisation are leading to the elimination of the old
Employee Councils, a process not mourned by Solidazity trade unions who want trade unions
to be the sole channel or representative. An interesting test of the importance attached by
employees as well as trade unions to such mechanisms took place in Hungary in May 1993,
when the provisions of the Labour Code relating to the election of Works Councils members
came into effect. In practice, the evidence suggests that unions were generally able to secure
the election of union members to the councils and the success of unions affiliated to MZOSC
was generally much greater than that of the newer unions. Thus, although there are cleaz
differences between the Labour Codes in the different countries with regard to participation
mechanisms, in practice trade unions remain the most significant charuiel for worker
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representation at enterprise level. Nevertheless, the preemptive nature of the new Labour Codes
may serve to limit or constrain more organic developments in the future.
At enterprise level there is growing evidence that senior management may seize the opportunity
to dismiss or ignore participative mechanisms. In case study companies in Russia and Poland
there are examples of the Director operating outside the legislation or on the borders of legality;
for example in Poland in advance of ownership change disestablishing the Employee Council
and in Russia, taking changes in ownership as a chance to get rid of the Council of the Labour
Collective.~ This reinforces the importance of enterprise level strategy and the developing role
of management. The relative autonomy of the enterprise and the scope for the development of
enterprise strategies will remain a critical element in the emerging labour relations models.
Clearly, an important factor shaping the character of corporatism and of labour relations models
is the changing role of the state which in turn, is shaped by conjunctures of different political
forces. In all of the East European countries, political processes remain semi-structured as
numerous competing political parties struggle to mobilise popular support. The absence of
min n parties of the kind found in Western countries results in weakened political legitimacy
with the effect that the role of the state as an ideolo~ical integrative mechanism is
underdeveloped. This strengthens the appeal of corporatism as a means of securing political
consent. The degree of popular support for this remains uncertain. Even so, State institutions
remain highly influential within the countries of Eastern Europe because of their functions in
the provision of health, education, welfare as well as other economically productive services.
As yet the nature of State institutions and how these are likely to emerge within ongoing
programmes of privatisation remains uncertain but undoubtedly this will have outcomes for the
character of tripartism and the role of labour relations models. Without the emergence of
political mobilisation, competing political parties and the construction of highly legitimised state
institutions, social pacts incorporating the interests of both workers and corporate owners are
likely to remain unstable.
The fortune of the current wave of tripartism will certainly play a key role and the level and
manner of articulation of bargains will help to structure the relationships between the different
levels of labour relations: the national, the branch and the enterprise. Perhaps the most
interesting question and the most difficult is the extent to which current developments, especially
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in the field of privatisation, may be foreclosing upon certain labour relations approaches or
options for the future. The explanation of developments will probably come from the
comparison of outcomes in one or more countries. This will facilitate the mapping of alternative
scenarios, in which the counter-factual - what does not happen- will be as significant and
interesting as what does.
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